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Abstract 
 
This paper presents an analysis of inter-modal competition in Brazil by making use of a 
reduced-form model of coach operators’ pricing decisions in the interstate travel market. 
Interstate travel service is heavily provided by coaches, and the system is fully operated by 
the private sector under public delegation, through permits and authorizations. Agency-
based regulation was introduced in 2002 and this new regulatory framework may stimulate 
competition in the market; particularly relevant in the new institutional design is the price 
cap regime that aims at enhancing the flexibility to change fares in response to demand and 
cost conditions. By analysing pricing decisions of coach operators in some cities within the 
country, we studied the sensitivity of coach fares to cost components and to air travel fares 
and therefore investigated whether there is competition with airlines after the regulatory 
reform. Inter-modal interaction among coach operators and airlines is found to be 
significant and probably due to the competition for a small set of premium, quality-
sensitive, coach passengers. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper aims at developing a reduced-form model of pricing decisions for the interstate 
travel market in Brazil, in order to investigate potential inter-modal competition. Interstate 
travel service within the country is heavily provided by coaches, which account for roughly 
ninety five percent of passengers; travel by plane is nowadays a potential substitute, 
although air tickets – usually much more expensive relatively to coach travel – are still 
unaffordable to the majority of coach travellers. We expect that intra-modal interaction 
among coach operators and airlines may emerge as a result of a competition for a smaller 
set of premium, quality-sensitive, coach passengers, who may be willing to pay for air 
travel during airline fare wars. 
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Inter-modal interaction may be regarded as a relevant issue nowadays, and yet to be further 
investigated by the literature; notable examples are Wardman (1997), and Ivaldi and Vibes 
(2005). In fact, Wardman (1997) points out that "relatively little is known about the 
interaction between modes in the inter-urban travel market".   
 
The system of interstate travel by coach in Brazil is fully operated by the private sector 
under public delegation, through permits and authorizations. Agency-based regulation was 
introduced in 2002 and this new regulatory framework may allow for further advances in 
competition. A price cap regime was introduced in order to enhance competition among 
operators, although it is still not possible to set prices below the tariff ceiling without 
previous communication to the agency.  
 
By analysing pricing decisions of operators in some cities within the country, here we 
intend to investigate potential price sensitivity to cost components and competitive pressure 
from airlines; the latter became certainly more relevant after the liberalization of the airline 
industry, during the nineties, and the recent entry of the low cost airline Gol Linhas Aéreas 
Inteligentes, in January 2001 (Oliveira, 2004, 2005).  
 
The paper is organized in four parts. Section 2 discusses the relevant features of the 
interstate travel market in Brazil; Section 3 presents the reduced-form model of pricing 
decisions by coach operators; Section 4 presents the discussion of estimation results; and 
finally, conclusions are presented. 
 
 
2. The Interstate Travel Market in Brazil 
 
In 2003, there were 210 interstate coach operators in Brazil. The biggest individual 
operator, Viação Itapemirim, had a 13.3% share under the passengers times kilometers 
criterion and none of the remaining operators held more than 7.5% of the market. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), calculated under the assumption of individual 
operators being independent companies, was 384 and the CR41 was 0.31. However, there 
are major economic groups that own several operators in this industry so that actual 
concentration is much higher than the values just presented. 
 
The ownership structure is changing rapidly over recent years. Some big merger or 
acquisition deals are taking place with relevant impact on market structure. For instance, 
two recent mergers, those of Penha/Pluma, and Cometa/1001/Catarinense, would increase 
the HHI by 127 points, or 33%, again considering individual operators not grouped up by 
ownership criteria. The CR4 would increase to 0,337 but it should be noticed that the the 
impact of mergers in some individual routes that were jointly served by merging operators 
may be even more significant. 
 
Besides not taking into account the problem of common ownership, overall concentration 
measures fail to account for the degree of competition that actually takes place in individual 
routes. Because the service is operated under public delegation, through permits and 
authorizations, most routes are served by a single operator. Competition is allowed in a few 
routes, notably the most important ones, including the shuttle service between Rio de 
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Janeiro-Sao Paulo, which carries 0.9 million passengers a year. The latter has competition 
in prices through discounts below the price cap and also in service attributes, as the route 
carries many coach travelers and may have an element of price differentiation. 
 
Regulation was transferred in 2002 to ANTT - Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres. 
Scheduled routes are now granted by ANTT through competitive bidding, in a process that 
requires the signature of a contract of concession. The operation of charter coach services is 
subject to a more swift process of authorization. The ANTT is taking further steps to 
enhance competition in markets with more density and is also trying to increase 
transparency by publishing relevant information such as tariffs in their website. So far the 
user can get to know the price cap for any route, its frequencies, special attributes offered 
and some additional information. However, she will not be able to find out whether an 
operator is offering discounts below the price cap. As Guimarães and Salgado (2003) point 
out, Brazil has a long way down the road towards more competition and better coach 
passenger transportation services. 
 
The Brazilian train system is under-developed and the amount of passengers carried in 
inter-state routes is negligible. Up to recently, inter-modal competition between coach and 
planes was very limited, but evidence seems to suggest an increase since the late 90’s. 
Waterways play some role in some states but are very specific to those markets. Finally, 
“self transportation” can be seen as a substitute to passenger transportation services by 
road, as supported by Guimarães and Salgado (2003). 
 
 
3. A Reduced-Form Pricing Model for Coach Transportation 
 
Our main objective here is to make inference about coach operators′ pricing behaviour and 
above all to infer the significance of inter-modal competition in Brazil from available data, 
which can be performed by estimating the sensitivity of coach fares to air travel fares once 
cost components are controlled for. In other to accomplish that, here we follow the airline 
literature, for example, Borenstein (1989) and Evans and Kessides (1993), and develop a 
reduced-form model for pricing decisions of firms in the market.  The pricing model 
employed is the following: 
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Where the mathematical operator Δ here means price change (in percentage) within one 
unit of time, that is, ΔXt is approximately equal to (ln Xt – ln Xt-1). 
 
Δcoachkt is the average change in intra-state coach fare in city k and time t; Δdieselkt, 
Δtirekt and Δtollkt are cost shifters, representing, respectively, the average change in the 
unit prices of diesel, tire, and motor oil in city k and time t; Δpetrolkt is the average change 
in the price of petrol in city k and time t; Δairlinekt is the average change in the price of air 
travel in city k and time t. γk, γt and γm are, respectively, city-specific, time-specific and 
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month-specific effects, designed to control for potential unobservables across cities and 
time, and also to account for seasonality across the year (γm).  
 
The dataset used was collected from Instituto Basileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), 
which produces the National System of Consumer Price Indexes; more precisely, we used 
the same data on transportation prices change collected for the Extensive National 
Consumer Price Index - IPCA. It is basically a set of monthly series from August 1999 to 
April 2005, disaggregated for the following geographic areas in Brazil: metropolitan 
regions of Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, 
Curitiba and Porto Alegre, Brasília and municipal district of Goiânia. We had to drop 
Belém, Fortaleza and Recife, however, as we detected no series of inter-state travel price 
change in the original data, as obtained from one of IBGE´s websites2. Therefore, the final 
sample size had 476 observations (k = 7 regions and t = 68 months), in a balanced panel 
data. 
 
One caveat about the data used here: as the most disaggregated unit of observation 
available from IBGE´s dataset was measured at the city-level, one has to be cautious when 
interpreting estimation results, as it is well recognized that the relevant market in 
transportation is actually the origin-and-destination pair. Therefore, our city fares analysis 
must be interpreted as the study of average behavior across origin-and-destination pairs. 
Besides that, we cannot observe average stage length for both coach and airline  
 
Below is Table 1, with some descriptive statistics for the variables in (1); note that, for 
simplicity, indexes k and t are omitted from now on:  
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
   Variablekt |           Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
  ------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     Δcoachkt |        0.923830    2.678064      -6.04      16.11 
    Δdieselkt |        1.536418    3.242790      -4.39       15.2 
      Δtirekt |        1.189462    1.644039      -2.81       7.79 
      Δtollkt |        1.188261    3.155881          0       17.9 
    Δpetrolkt |        1.064161    4.021127     -13.65      14.83 
   Δairlinekt |        1.316335    4.231087     -18.53      24.81 
 
Note: variables expressed in nominal percentage.  
 
 
 
The estimator used here is the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), allowing for 
estimation in the presence of panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and cross-sectional 
correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels. Also, as (1) permits observing, there are 
both time (months) and section (cities) fixed effects. 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results: 
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Table 2 – Estimation Results 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels:        heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation 
Correlation:   panel-specific AR(1) 
 
Estimated covariances      =        28          Number of obs      =       483 
Estimated autocorrelations =         7          Number of groups   =         7 
Estimated coefficients     =        79          Time periods       =        69 
                                                Wald chi2(79)      = 518232.11 
Log likelihood             = -505.1321          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     Δcoachkt t|      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
t-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Δdieselktt |   .0963080   .0468780     2.05   0.040     .0044288    .1881872 
      Δtirektt |   .0400761   .0392132     1.02   0.307    -.0367804    .1169326 
      Δtollktt |   .3223314   .0183595    17.56   0.000     .2863474    .3583153 
    Δpetrolktt |  -.0401422    .023142    -1.73   0.083    -.0854996    .0052152 
   Δairlinektt |   .0406109   .0199123     2.04   0.041     .0015835    .0796384 
        γfebtt  |  -.1271111   .1805876    -0.70   0.482    -.4810563     .226834 
        γmartt  |  -.2236079   .1981258    -1.13   0.259    -.6119273    .1647115 
        γaprtt  |  -.3242311   .1701323    -1.91   0.057    -.6576843    .0092221 
        γmaytt  |   .0041366   .1231831     0.03   0.973    -.2372977     .245571 
        γjuntt  |  -.3872105   .2564612    -1.51   0.131    -.8898653    .1154443 
        γjultt  |   3.942331   .2966829    13.29   0.000     3.360844    4.523819 
        γaugtt  |   1.679964   .3539738     4.75   0.000     .9861877     2.37374 
        γseptt  |  -.1427403   .2062176    -0.69   0.489    -.5469193    .2614388 
        γocttt  |   -.634172   .2896711    -2.19   0.029    -1.201917    -.066427 
        γnovtt  |  -1.356757   .7282589    -1.86   0.062    -2.784119    .0706039 
        γdectt  |   .5508586   .4791721     1.15   0.250    -.3883016    1.490019 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Note: Estimated time and city-specific effects (γk and γt) omitted 
 
 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
 
As we have earlier pointed out, coach transportation potentially suffers from inter-modal 
competition with self transportation and with air transportation. The reduced-form pricing 
model estimated and presented in Section 3 may offer some evidence on the degree of 
inter-modal competition that characterizes these markets. 
 
We tested for the presence of inter-modal interaction (probably due to a substitution effect) 
among air and road transportation for the inter-state market, and found a small but 
significant effect. In fact, one cannot reject, at five percent of significance, the null that 
airline fare variations have no effect on coach fare variations. This result is achieved once 
relevant cost components are accounted for – that is, price variation of diesel, tire and toll. 
This is quite a relevant outcome because the coach travel industry is usually regarded as a 
major cartel in Brazil, that is, not subject to internal competitive pressure; thus, the results 
here indicate that there is significant competition stemming from inter-modal competition 
with airlines. 
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It is important to emphasize that the interaction between the air and road markets for 
passenger transportation may take place in their borders. Premium coach passengers, that 
is, those who are able to pay for the highest fares as they have higher sensitivity to coach 
quality, are the effective marginal consumers in this market; therefore they constitute the 
smaller set of passengers who consider changing means of transportation when price 
differences narrow down. So the airline industry has been from time to time appealing to 
the upper-class coach passengers, who go for flying during air fare wars or deep discount 
periods, and eventually go back to the coach service in ordinary periods. The estimated 
coefficient of Δairlinekt, in Table 2, may then suggest that cross-elasticities between air and 
ground transportation of passengers are no longer negligible in Brazil – a phenomenon that 
certainly deserve further investigation. 
 
The main relevant variables for the choice between coach and car driving include 
infrastructure usage fees (road tolls and coach/airport terminal fee), fuel costs and car 
maintenance. We assumed that terminal costs are negligible. As for toll prices, any change 
will equally affect coach transportation and car driving because we worked with variations 
rather than levels. We also found that gasoline price has a negative (but not much 
significant) effect on coach prices, a counter-intuitive result. Tire prices may be used as a 
proxy for car maintenance expenses, but it affects both forms of transportation and thus 
price changes were not significant for explaining pricing behavior. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to identify and measure potential inter-modal competition 
in the interstate travel market in Brazil. By estimating a reduced-form model of pricing 
decisions of coach operators, it was possible to test whether the inter-modal interaction 
between air and road transportation was significant. 
 
Results indicated that coach fares are sensitive to air fares, indicating significant interaction 
and potential substitution effect. This is quite a relevant outcome because the coach travel 
industry is usually regarded as a major cartel in Brazil and therefore not usually subject 
competitive pressure. The most probable explanation for that is related to the presence of 
premium coach passengers, with higher willingness-to-pay, who go for flying during air 
fare wars or deep discount periods, and eventually go back to the coach service in ordinary 
periods.  
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